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TRADING THE PEOPLE’S HOMES FOR THE PEOPLE’S
OLYMPICS: THE PROPERTY REGIME IN CHINA
Theresa H. Wang†
Abstract: China is under increasing international scrutiny as the country’s
economic growth launches the previously isolated nation onto the world stage. As the
national wealth increases at a record rate, the government is constantly modifying
strategies to ensure its economic stability. In response to this nearly unmanageable
growth, entire Chinese cities are remodeled and progressively more privatized, while
urban dwellers are evicted from their homes in the name of economic development.
These urban land acquisitions often occur with little or no compensation, while private
developers reap the economic benefits. These policies follow a pattern of development
replayed throughout history, notably in the nineteenth-century United States. This
Comment focuses on these similarities, explores the fundamental differences between the
American past and the Chinese present regarding property rights, acknowledges the
improbability of China’s adopting Western models of governance wholesale, and
ultimately argues the national government should reform its policies on urban
requisitions to include viable venues of just compensation for victims of forced evictions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2000, Beijing finally won a long, hard-fought battle to be the host
city for the 2008 Olympics.1 The streets of the city filled with jubilation and
national pride as thousands of people flocked to Tiananmen Square—the
once infamous plaza became a center of celebration.2 While the citizens
rejoiced, the Chinese government immediately began preparations to build
an Olympic project unprecedented in modern history.3 As a catalyst for the
modernization of Beijing, the government cleared miles of residential land
for new complexes and infrastructure in preparation for the critical eyes of
the international community. 4 These actions are attracting worldwide

†
University of Washington School of Law, J.D. expected 2007. The author would like to thank
Professor Zang for his tireless enthusiasm, assistance, and invaluable advice at every stage of this Comment,
the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, without whom this Comment would have been
impossible, and of course, her family and friends for their support.
1
Melinda Liu, Games and Grievances: When Officials Dreamed Up Catchphrases Like ‘The
People’s Olympics’ Who Knew the Public Would Take the Words Seriously?, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 2005, at
46.
2
Lin Ting Li, 2008 Olympics, HARV. INT’L REV., April 1, 2005.
3
Alan Abrahanson, Built in Commitment; Beijing Has Become a Huge Construction Site in Order
to Stage the 2008 Olympics, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at D.5.
4
Patrick A. Randolph, Professor, University of Missouri, Kansas City, Statement to the
Congressional- Executive Commission on China Issues Roundtable: Property Seizures in China: Politics,
Law, and Protest (February 3, 2003) available at http://cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/062104/Randolph.php.
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scrutiny as hundreds of thousands of homes are taken in China’s drive for
economic development.5
China, however, is no stranger to this kind of attention. Controversial
policies, such as the decision to undertake the project of the Three Gorges
Dam, and the economy’s improbable growth, have effectively placed the
previously secretive nation within the international gaze.6 With the pressure
of being the fastest growing economy in the world,7 China is undertaking a
large-scale urban renewal project with the aim of encouraging private
development and new infrastructure. 8 Collective urban land in China is
increasingly allocated to private developers, transforming courtyard homes
housing multiple families to commercial property. 9 In Beijing alone, the
government has evicted about 300,000 residents from their homes per year,
sometimes forcefully, in order for the city to make way for the thirty-eight
billion dollar Olympic project. 10 These evictions reportedly happen without
notice, minimal or no compensation, and little legal recourse.11
In response to these forced evictions, the citizens have taken to the
streets again, but not in celebration.12 According to one estimate, hundreds
of thousands of displaced residents have participated in protests against
forced evictions.13 These protests range from peaceful sit-ins and marches
on Beijing, to self-immolation and suicide. 14 The Chinese government
responded to these protests by arresting both protest leaders and lawyers
attempting to defend the rights of the evicted.15
5

See discussion infra Part II.
China is currently undertaking the most ambitious, largest man-made dam project in history on the
Yangtze River. For more discussion on dams and human rights implications, see Jen Lin-Liu, Out with the
Old and in with the New around China’s Three Gorges Dam. But at What Cost?, 192 ARCHITECTURAL
REC. 57 (2004).
7
See generally Charles Wolf Jr., China: An Emerging “Economic Superpower”?, in CHINA IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM, MARKET REFORMS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 11 (James A. Dorn ed., 1998).
8
Forced Evictions and Land Requisitions, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
2004 ANN. REP. (2005) available at http://cecc.gov/pages/virtual/Acad/rol/property2004.php?mode=print.
Rural land requisitions are out of the scope of this Comment, for further discussion of this aspect, see RDI
Memorandum from Brian Schwarzwalder, Roy Prosterman, & Li Ping, Land Takings in China: Policy
Recommendations (June 5, 2003) (on file with RDI); PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA
(Jean C. Oi & Andrew G. Walder eds., 2005); Arjun Subrahmanyan, Land Use in China: The Impact of the
Economic Revolution, 18 CHINA LAW & PRACTICE 24 (2004).
9
See, e.g., Liu Qing, The Legal Time Bomb of Urban Redevelopment, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, No. 2,
2003, at 68.
10
Abrahamson, supra note 3.
11
Sara Meg Davis & Lin Hai, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenant’s Rights Movement in
China, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1,12.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Bill Savadove, Special Police Units to Counter Protests and Terrorism Threats, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, August 19, 2005, at 7.
14
Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 1-3.
15
Id. at 4.
6
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What might be surprising given this backdrop, however, is that the
Chinese government has been taking steps toward a more definitive rule-oflaw, loosening its grip on social controls and acquiescing to more reforms.16
This allowance led to recognition of property rights, even constitutional
reforms acknowledging the right to compensation for the state’s use of
eminent domain.17 There are official regulations that provide avenues for
disputing the amount of compensation offered to the evictee, as well as a
right to file civil suit for inadequate settlements at adjudication.18 The level
of enforcement by the Chinese judiciary, however, leaves much to be desired.
Similar gaps between statutory authority and the political reality of
property rights enforcement is a repetitive theme throughout world history.
In the United States during the nineteenth century, early government
regulation of urban land favored private development over individual land
rights.19 Faced with a growing nation, the United States government was
likewise under pressure to adapt to a rapidly growing market economy, and
responded by putting its land into the hands of private developers.20 China’s
current policies, albeit tumultuous, mimic strategies the United States
undertook in times of national economic expansion. The United States also
prioritized economic development by transferring private property to the
hands of private developers.
While it is easy to encourage China to take the same course America
did in granting absolute protection of individual property rights, the
characteristics of the two countries differ to the extent that this wholesale
adoption would be unreasonable. Given the intensity of international
scrutiny and social unrest in China now, the laws and procedure regarding
the recent forced evictions is an ideal place to begin discussing Chinese
property reform. This Comment aims to reveal the similarities between
Chinese economic development and the early American market evolution, as
well as explore the fundamental differences between the two. Part II of this
Comment briefly describes the Chinese government’s historic property
regime, traces its evolution to current reforms in individual property rights,
and addresses international agreements and the ramifications of China’s
16

Legal Reforms in China, a Hollow Mantra?, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, July 8, 2005.
Chan Siu-sin, Draft Property Law Allows Abuse, Says Analyst, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
July 11, 2005.
18
Chengshi fangwu chaiqian guanli tiaoli [Administrative Regulations on Urban House Demolition
and Relocation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 13, 2001, effective Nov.
1, 2001), art 16, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005)(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Administrative
Regulations].
19
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 128 (1996).
20
Id.
17
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membership in the global community. In addition, it clarifies how current
property rights and the eviction process function, both in codified form and
practically, focusing on the problematic gap between the two. Part III
compares these Chinese policies with those of nineteenth century America,
exploring early American jurisprudence that allowed massive allocations of
public resources to private developers. Part IV emphasizes the similarities
between the two countries’ methods and suggests that absolute property
rights are simply not conducive to economic development, whether in early
America or current Chinese policies. Finally, Part V offers a realistic
solution to the problem of forced evictions, applying recent Chinese judicial
reforms to battle corruption at the adjudication level to take steps toward an
equitable system. This section will also argue that it is in China’s best
interest both globally and domestically to revise its eviction process by
revisiting the subject of international scrutiny. This Comment ultimately
recommends such changes as a positive step to renew faith in the system,
quell the criticism of the government, and refocus global attention on the
positive changes within the Chinese government.
II.

THE EVOLVING CHINESE PROPERTY REGIME IS A DRAMATIC
DEPARTURE FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S TRADITIONAL
PRINCIPLES

The increased protection of property rights since the founding of the
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) is a remarkable evolution in itself.
Upon the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese
Communist Party (“CCP”) 21 invoked massive land reform policies,
transferring most privately owned land into the hands of the common
collective.22 Since then, however, the government has undergone massive
changes, including widespread privatization of its urban land.23
A.

China’s Property Law Has Gone from Virtually Nonexistent to Being
a Constitutionally Recognized Right in Just over Two Decades

Given the historical background of the property regime in communist
China, the recent Constitutional amendments recognizing individual
21
As the Chinese government operates under a one-party system, the term “CCP” is used
interchangeably with “the state” and “the government” in this Comment.
22
JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 516 (1990).
23
Andrew G. Walder & Jean C. Oi, Property Rights in the Chinese Economy: Contours of the
Process of Change, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 11 (Jean C. Oi & Andrew G.
Walder eds., 1999).
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property rights are revolutionary. Though the early PRC recognized a
degree of private property rights in urban areas, the CCP regularly
confiscated privately owned property for “national construction” under the
Maoist regime from 1949 to 1976.24 Most of the urban land holdings in
China were private despite the Communist regime, as property ownership
was undefined, but allowed to a small degree in the early 1950s.25 By the
late 1950s, the Chinese government had exerted extensive control over the
land in its cities, rendering private ownership extremely weak. 26 The
vulnerability of private ownership was pushed further to ruination during the
tumultuous Maoist campaigns, initiated in the name of “constant
revolution.”27 Following the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, China lost
any semblance of the rule of law, creating a chaotic environment that
instigated a policy change from “class struggle” to “economic
development.”28 This new interpretation of socialism entailed a redefinition
of the communist property regime and the CCP’s policies regarding
ownership.29
The death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent rise of Deng Xiaopeng
in 1978 gave birth to a modified Communist China.30 In this rebirth, the
concept of individual or corporate property rights regained some definition,
both legally and in practice.31 This new administration searched for a way to
merge central economic planning with market principles. 32 Deng’s
declaration that “urban individual residents can purchase houses, they can
sell them, and they can also benefit from them”33 fleshed out a notion of a
“bundle” of property rights the private citizen could hold.34 Though initially
directed at encouraging foreign investment to stimulate China’s then24

WILLIAM D. SOILEAU, PAST IS PRESENT: URBAN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND HOUSING REFORM
IN THE P.R.C. 12 (1994).
25

Id. at 13.
Id. at 28-29.
27
SPENCE, supra note 22, at 704.
28
Yingyi Qian, The Process of China’s Market Transition (1978-98): The Evolutionary, Historical,
and Comparative Perspectives, Paper Prepared for the Symposium on “Big-Bang Transformation of
Economic Systems as a Challenge to New Institutional Economics,” in J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON., June 9-11, 1999, at 4.
29
Id. at 16.
30
See generally SUZANNE OGDEN, CHINA’S UNRESOLVED ISSUES 349-362 (1995) (parenthetical
explanation here).
31
Louis Putterman, The Role of Ownership and Property Rights in China’s Economic Transition,
144 China Q. 1047, 1048 (1995).
32
Yingyi Qian, supra note 28, at 9.
33
SOILEAU, supra note 24, at 58.
34
See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTION, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) (arguing that modern property rights are stabilized in institutions ensuring clear
contractual and property rights).
26
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struggling economy, this policy eventually affected domestic property rights
as well. 35 Deng’s administration, realizing the importance of joining the
world market and gaining the confidence of foreign investors, allowed
certain property rights to be legally enforced. 36 Liberalizing reforms of
property rights for both international and domestic entrepreneurs encouraged
growth in the real estate market, notably in the newly created Special
Economic Zones.37 This era brought about an increasingly privatized China,
necessarily decentralizing the CCP’s power and distributing it to various
private sectors of society to boost the economy.38
The success of these strategies in attracting foreign investment
encouraged the government to expand its policies.39 By protecting property
rights for investors, China had effectively catalyzed its economy and
forcefully entered the international market as a viable competitor. 40 A
current estimate places state-owned enterprises in the increasingly privatized
PRC as responsible for only a third of the national output value.41 In 2002,
President Jiang Zemin encouraged the Chinese to “conform to the time and
follow the law of development and display great creativity...keeping pace
with the times.”42 In order to sustain an energetic entry on the international
market, Jiang’s government recognized the importance of further defining
property rights.43 This was not in the interest of creating vested rights in the
citizenry at large, however: it functioned to protect the interests of investors,
with the hope of catalyzing the economy. 44 In 2005, National People’s
Congress45 chairman Wu Bangguo declared “[t]he property law is one of the
cardinal laws that supports our socialist legal framework with Chinese
characteristics, and it plays an important role in protecting the fundamental

35

TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 242 (2d ed. 2004).
Asia: Ideological gymnastics; China, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2004, at 68.
37
SPENCE, supra note 22, at 674.
38
Jieming Zhu, Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of China’s
Transition Economy, 26 INT’L. J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 52, 54 (2002).
39
Yingyi Qian, supra note 28, at 14 (citing that foreign direct investment in China increased from
4.4 billion in 1991 to 28 billion in 1993).
40
Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13
(2000).
41
James A. Dorn, China’s Future Depends Upon Protecting Rights, ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL,
July 19, 2004, at A9.
42
SAICH, supra note 35 at 346-47.
43
Id. at 243.
44
Id. at 242-43.
45
The National People’s Congress is defined in the 1982 Constitution as “the highest organ of state
power.” See CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: China’s Government Structure, available at
http://cecc.gov. [hereinafter Government Structure].
36
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interests of our people and our economic system.”46 The national goal of
managing these competing interests becomes a balancing test for the
People’s Congress.47 To further its interests, the CCP initiated the “Three
Represents” campaign to frame the future of China around “representing the
development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of
China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the
overwhelming majority of the people.”48 Some legal scholars interpret this
campaign as a methodology to incorporate capitalists into the CCP’s
membership, as a way of institutionalizing the economic development
instigated by these private parties.49
In order to further its economic strength in the world market, China
became a member of international organizations and party to a number of
international agreements.50 Among these, China ratified the United Nations
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
2001(“ICESCR”). 51 The document, which sets forth an international
standard of human rights for its parties, defines “forced evictions” as “the
permanent or temporary removal against the will of individuals…from the
homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access
to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.”52 The ICESCR further
stipulates that “forced evictions are prima facie incompatible” with the
document’s purpose.53 China gained international legitimacy as a result of
ratifying the ICESCR, and found itself on equal footing with other nations
within the realm of international law.54 The policy to clarify property rights
was originally established to further foreign interests, but with that objective
46
Shi Jiangtao, NPC Delays Passage of Property Legislation Disagreement over Compensation for
State Requisitions Is a Major Reason, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 2005.
47
Dorn, supra note 41.
48
Jia Hepeng, The Three Represents Campaign: Reform the Party or Indoctrinate the Capitalists?,
24 CATO J. 261, 261 (2004).
49
See, e.g., Hepeng, supra note 48 (proposing that Chinese legal reforms, including the 2004
constitutional amendments, were enacted to legitimize capitalist membership in the CCP).
50
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, art. 17,
establishing property ownership and protection guarantees; FORCED EVICTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
U.N.H.C.R. Fact Sheet No. 25(1996) (declaring forced evictions in violation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights).
51
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Sup. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976, art. 11., ratified by China on June 27, 2001. The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment 7 reemphasizes the right to adequate housing and freedom from forced
evictions (1991).
52
The Right to Adequate Housing (Art.11.1): Forced Evictions. THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, CESCR General Comment 7, May 20, 1997.
53
Id.
54
Frank Ching, In the Eye of the Beholder, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 2005.
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gained, China’s global reputation now entails enacting domestic property
rights reform to protect individual interests.
B.

China’s Current Property Regime and Regulations Regarding Urban
Demolition and Relocation Provide Inadequate Means for Legal
Redress

Despite an apparent legal framework, the CCP’s present law
providing the procedures for demolition and relocation fails to present
sufficient avenues for the aggrieved. Following recognition and investment
from the global community, the CCP enacted domestic property rights
reforms.55 The Land Management Law’s amendments in 1986 reflect this
recognition of domestic property rights, declaring that the right to use State
or collectively owned land could be allocated by law.56 Accompanying this
evolution, China gave recognition to individual property rights in the form
of land-use rights.57 Because all urban land is owned by the state, fee simple
ownership is not possible. The law still confers a certain degree of usufruct
rights to the citizens residing on the state’s land, however, allowing them to
use the land as if it were their own. 58 This land-use right essentially
functions as a leasehold wherein the individual resident has the right to use
the land without restriction, given proper allocation by the state.59
The People’s Congress also passed constitutional amendments
regarding private property rights in 2004.60 These amendments legitimize a
degree of capitalist activity in socialist terms by maintaining the state’s right
to seize lands for public use, a right mitigated by language that was added to
ensure proper compensation.61 Citizens were encouraged by the language of
the amendments and eagerly bought 2.8 million copies of the amended
55

See discussion in Lan Cao, supra note 40.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tu di guan li fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 2, translated in
ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
57
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Urban Real Estate, art. 22
(adopted January 1, 2001), translated in ISINOLAW.
58
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tu di guan li fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 8, translated in
ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005); see also STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN
CHINA AFTER MAO 184 (1999).
59
LUBMAN, supra note 58, at 184.
60
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xian fa xiu zhen gan [Amendments to Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2004, effective Mar. 14, 2004),
translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Aug. 23, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Amendments].
61
Amendments, supra note 60, art. 22 provides, “The lawful private property of citizens shall not be
encroached upon…the State may, in the public interest, expropriate or requisition private property of
citizens and pay compensation in accordance with the law”; see also Hepeng, supra note 48.
56
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Constitution.62 This constitutional language also provided encouragement to
those in the Chinese legal community who advocated for passage of the
amendments.63 A facial reading of these amendments reveal a similarity to
the United States’ Takings Clause, which also guarantees the right to “just
compensation” for the government’s use of eminent domain.64
These amendments contrast with China’s historic legal record, which
continues to threaten the private right to own land. 65 Despite these
capitalistic amendments, the government’s extensive history of favoritism
towards economic development allows for land seizures in the “public
interest.”66 As such, the nature of the leaseholds granted to private citizens
to live on the state’s urban land is perpetually subject to government control
and regulation. 67 For example, the Beijing Olympics project has cleared
miles upon miles of residential land to make way for green spaces and
hosting facilities. 68 The official reason for clearing away the traditional
residences and alleyways was that the old homes were “dangerous,” but
most evicted residents remain unconvinced.69 Other takings justified by the
“public interest” involve the building of new luxury condominiums,
shopping malls, and commercial office buildings. 70 According to
government statistics, over thirty million people have had their residential
land requisitioned for development, in large part for the country’s massive
Olympic project.71
1.

The Procedure of Urban Demolition and Relocation Results in Unfair
Consequences for Those Forcefully Evicted for Development Projects.

The law regarding urban demolition and relocation passed by the
People’s Congress provides framework for procedures to evict but lacks
62
Grady Epstein, Chinese Reforms Yet to Register at Local Levels; the Chinese Constitution
Guarantees Both Individual and Property Rights—on Paper, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 18, 2004, at 1.A
63
Id.
64
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65
See generally Jacques deLisle, Property Rights Reform in China, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, January 29, 2004.
66
Jieming Zhu, Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of China’s
Transition Economy, 26 INT’L. J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 52 (March 2002).
67
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tu di guan li fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 8, translated in
ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
68
Jane Macartney, Thousands of homes destroyed to make way for Olympic tourists, TIMES (UK),
May 26, 2005.
69
John Taylor, Beijing Gets a Facelift Ahead of 2008 Olympics, WORLD TODAY, July 22, 2005.
70
FINANCIAL EXPRESS, supra note 16.
71
Id.
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clarity and transparency to claim compensation. The Administrative
Regulations on Urban House Demolition and Relocation (“Regulations”)
provide the process for a developer or the state to apply for demolition of a
property.72 Once the demolition is approved, the private developer or the
state then negotiates compensation with the residents of the property.73 The
only stipulation on notice is that local governments must alert the urban
residents sometime before approval or amendment of a development plan.74
Some municipalities require notice to the residents, but there is no national
standard. 75 The Regulations clearly state that upon approval of the
development plans, the evictee must move out within the specified time limit,
even if negotiation regarding monetary compensation is not complete.76 The
evictees may dispute the offered compensation, but the developers have the
right to “advance enforcement.” 77 There is no way for the residents to
challenge the underlying eviction ex ante, only the compensation amount ex
post. As a result, many evictees attempt to stay in their homes until
agreement is reached.78 This often causes violent forced evictions, where
the evicting authorities take matters into their own hands, frequently
employing dangerous demolition methods.79 Reports allege that electricity
and water supplies are shut off in order to drive out persistent residents.80
Some residents claim they have come home to find their homes demolished
without warning, while others report measures as extreme as arson. 81
Evictees even report demolition crews yelling “Earthquake!” in the middle
of the night in order to clear residents: in other instances, the demolition
begins while families are still inside. 82 These clearance methods are
purportedly responsible for many accidental deaths during dangerous
evictions.83
These same Regulations further stipulate that adjudication boards that
handle compensation disputes are “the administrative departments in charge
72

See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, Ch. 2-3.
Davis and Hai, supra note 11, at 13.
74
See Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Chengzhen Fangwu Gongzuo Weihu Shehui Wending de Jinji
Tongzhi [Urgent Circular Concerning Better Implementation of Urban Development to Protect Social
Stability] (issued on Sept. 19, 2003 by the State Council).
75
Pamela Phan, Enriching the Land or the Political Elite? Lessons From China on Democratization
of the Urban Renewal Process, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y. J. 607, 632 (2005).
76
See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, art. 16.
77
Id. art. 15.
78
Davis and Hai, supra note 11, at 3.
79
Epstein, supra note 63.
80
Davis and Hai, supra note 11, at 11.
81
Id. at 9.
82
Id.
83
Liu Qing, supra note 9, at 70.
73
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of housing demolition and relocation,” which are comprised of the same
people who approved the demolition in the first place.84 As the beneficiaries
of fees and other costs paid by developers, these boards are often biased.85
There are further allegations that various municipal administrative boards
are corrupt bureaucracies tilted in favor of the developers, as well as
speculation of bribes and pay-offs.86 These governmental bodies’ interests,
in their capacities as regulators of socialist market forces, are prone to align
themselves with helping the flourishing economy at the cost of the
evictees. 87 Chinese lawyer Gao Zhisheng reported to China Economic
Times that “officials at all levels of the bureaucracy routinely operate as if
these laws don’t exist.” 88 The offered compensation amount will rarely
adequately cover the cost of a new home in the area, adding to the problem
of homelessness in China.89
The Regulations offer a final, yet still inadequate, avenue of legal
redress.90 If a party remains unsatisfied with the amount offered, they then
may file for civil suit in the People’s Court.91 This measure has also proven
ineffective, however, to assist evicted tenants battling compensation
amounts. 92 Most complaints and negotiations are already stifled in the
administrative stage described above, and usually with massive
disappointment on the part of the tenant.93 To further frustrate these efforts,
the Supreme People’s Court recently issued a ruling that People’s Courts are
not to accept compensation disputes until the proscribed adjudication
remedies are exhausted, or until the evictees have accepted a compensation
settlement with the developers.94 Though this exhaustion requirement seems
routine and equitable, most claims are dispensed with in the administrative
process and never reach the civil courts.95

84
85
86
87

See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, art. 16.
Liu Qing, supra note 9, at 68.
Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 6-7.
See CHIH-YU SHIH, COLLECTIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA 38-39

(1999).
88

Liu Qing, supra note 9, at 68.
Id. at 69.
See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, art. 16.
91
Id.
92
Phan, supra note 75, at 609.
93
Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 14.
94
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The Chinese judiciary has yet to recognize a claim based on
constitutionally based rights. 96 Attempts to bring a civil suit or petition
officials often results in incarceration, and there are even reports of officials
preventing evictees from boarding trains to Beijing to air their grievances
and protest at the capital.97 Evicted residents who manage to organize a
challenge and file a case in civil court find themselves routinely turned away
for lack of jurisdiction or authority over the previous agency’s decision. 98
According to one source, of over 18,000 real estate disputes filed in Beijing,
less than 4,000 were actually heard in the first half of 2004.99 Among the
hundreds of thousands of evictees, many remain homeless as a result of
receiving minimal or no compensation for their homes, and others were
forced to move far outside the cities where their families lived for
generations.100 Many of those evicted cannot afford to live in the new urban
landscape and are left out of the growing market economy.101
2.

The Unenforceability of These Regulations Emphasizes the Tension
Between the CCP’s Motivations for Economic Development and the
Social Need for More Predictable Property Rights.

These regulations and unfair practices highlight the tension between
the Chinese government’s interests in encouraging economic development
while also providing for the population. While there remains a residual
national pride in China’s newfound wealth, frustration has spread throughout
the cities. 102 Thus, the existing regulations and reforms, while still an
impressive step, fall victim to a larger constellation of problems in China:
the government’s interest in economic development is too strong, monetary
incentives encourage corruption in the bureaucracy, and the system lacks
accountability, all while the widening social gap grows daily. 103 The
decentralization of the CCP’s power base has generated myriad private,
96
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municipal, and governmental interest parties all competing in the lucrative
real estate market in China, rendering the private leaseholds subject to these
powerful entities.104 Chinese property reforms appear enforceable and fair
on the macro level, but prove weak and subject to governmental interests in
practice, creating a need for transparency. 105 Unfair as it may seem,
favoring economic development over individual property rights is not a new
concept for a fast-growing nation.
III.

IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN
POLICIES ARE STRIKINGLY SIMILAR IN METHODOLOGY

AND

CHINESE

In this era of international standards and human rights law, China’s
actions appear extreme. The early United States, however, utilized
analogous policies in order to accomplish successful development. China’s
willingness to use governmental powers to side with private developers at
the expense of the individual mirrors the United States government’s
policies in the nineteenth century.
A.

Nineteenth Century American Policies Regarding Economic
Development Closely Resemble Current Chinese Procedures

The appearance of the Chinese government rampantly abusing human
rights takes on a more nuanced character when compared to American
nineteenth century jurisprudence. The CCP’s siding with private developers
in order to stimulate modernization parallels strategies undertaken by the
early American government. The current interpretation of the Chinese
constitutional amendments is in actuality not a far cry from early
interpretations of the Takings Clause. Although theorists deem strong
property rights are required to establish a resilient economy, the historical
record reveals that this was not consistently the case in early United States.
What began as a tenuous right to property in nineteenth century America has
morphed into an absolute and guaranteed right as each era has espoused its
own interpretation.106 In early America, the “public interest” of economic
prosperity overrode individual rights. 107 While this young economy was
transitioning, the weaker property rights of individuals contributed to the
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strength of developers, driving the market forces to a stable state.108 Thus,
the concept of American “vested rights” arose as a social construction only
after the strength of the nation’s economy was secure. These rights are
subject to the socioeconomic conditions and needs of the nation, and no
single definition can be the universal optimum.109 The evolution of the early
definition of American property rights is explored in the next section.
1.

The United States Legislature Encouraged Policies of Production and
Growth

During the early development of the American economy, strong
government regulation of land use was generally an allowable tactic to
advance the fledging market economy.110 The conception of early American
government’s laissez-faire market economy is largely a myth that gives way
to an era of strong government regulation of land use.111 The public right to
land was often cited as justification for private takings, often with
compensation below market value, or in extreme cases, none at all.112 James
Willard Hurst characterizes this era as an attempt by American government
to “release energy” by encouraging private developers to make the best use
of land. 113 These policies were similar to the current Chinese property
regime, allocating vast amounts of resources to the hands of the wealthy elite
in order to best accommodate the market economy. 114 The concept of
property rights emerges as a social creation in an examination of the early
American interest in creating a legitimate role for its emerging corporate
wealth.115
In the drive to catalyze America’s fledging economy, there was no
absolute right to property, as individual rights were subservient to the
government’s interest in developing its national market. Diverging from the
original English legal tradition that absolutely protected vested rights, the
American policy in the early nineteenth century favored dynamic,
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productive property over static property at rest.116 This principle resulted in
private investment spurring the economy at the cost of the individuals who
simply had no legal recourse. Early American jurisprudence placed the
burden of persuasion on the injured, during an era where
“[n]oncompensation was the general rule, not the exception.”117
Studies of this period highlight a great deal of expropriation and
confiscation without compensation while emphasizing the coercive nature of
property in any society. 118 Legislatures were eager to attract investment,
oftentimes at the expense of individual property owners. 119 Many
Americans found themselves without legal recourse, even when eminent
domain powers were not used for traditional “public use” but for delegating
resources to private parties, with whom the government sided.120 In other
words, the public power of eminent domain transferred interests wholesale
to private entrepreneurs while the aggrieved property owners found the
courts largely unresponsive.121
2.

The United States Judiciary Deferred to the Pro-Growth Policies of
the Legislature

The interest in forging a dynamic market economy was the chief
concern of both lawmakers and the supportive judiciary in a fledging
America. 122 The judiciary exercised extensive deference to these
government decisions to take property as well as maintaining a liberal
definition of “public interest.”123 The public interest defined itself in terms
of what a situation or community deemed necessary at the time, even if the
principle beneficiary was private profit.124 Decisions such as the Shreveport
Cases, where Chief Justice Shaw declared that “the law aims to be practical,
and to favor what is practicable,” reveal the mindset of the judiciary at the
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time. 125 Hurst observes that these rulings characterize the legacy of the
nineteenth century United States, and its tendency to highly value “change
more than stability…property in motion or at risk rather than property secure
and at rest.”126 Protecting private property, then, was a means to an end.
“Vested rights” were thus developed in order to open up the continent and
facilitate business interests to generate and protect venture capital, not the
individual property rights of the citizens.127 For example, in Wisconsin, a
federal judge supported the government’s delegation of the power of
eminent domain to a private waterpower developer, simply by assuming that
capital had been invested and economic prosperity had resulted.128
The government used positive law in order to achieve its goals,
maximizing the productive potential of a developing nation. 129 Justice
Holmes wrote, in support of these policies, that “the absolute protection of
property…is hardly consistent with the requirements of modern business.”130
In fact, damnum absque injuria (an injury without a remedy) was a common
judicial tool for legal positivists in early America, where judges were not
uncomfortable leaving victims without compensation as long as the
government had a semblance of just cause.131 As William J. Novak puts it,
judicial decisions during this time of development did not “reason upward
from private rights and particular injuries…instead they reasoned downward
from autonomous conceptions of state powers, public rights, and the general
welfare of the society.” 132 Novak observes that much of the courts’
instrumentalist tendency ultimately favored “large and efficient, private
developmental interests in the release of capitalist energies,” thus supporting
wide police powers in a strongly-regulated United States. 133
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Comparing Early American Policies and Current Chinese Practice
Reveals Similar Strategies of Economic Development with Different
Theoretical Underpinnings

Despite contrasting ideologies, early American and current Chinese
policies follow analogous paths in developing their respective national
markets. As the above discussion reveals, the early American government
was not adverse to seizing private property and allocating these resources to
private developers. The CCP currently undertakes these same methods in
order to accomplish its economic goals. The vulnerability of property rights
in China, however, has reached a breaking point, and China has the legal
infrastructure to enact its own reforms without adopting Western methods.
Under the international gaze, it is in China’s interest to give weight to
individual property rights and enforce the constitutional right to
compensation.
In many ways, the early American record and the current Chinese
policies defy the assumption that clearly defined and predictable property
and contractual rights are prerequisites to foster economic growth. 134
Economic theories posit that clearly defined property rights such as the right
to definitively own, sell, and benefit from one’s property are key to the
positive growth of a market economy,135 while vaguely defined rights create
inefficiencies and hinder growth.136 Both the early American legal system
and China’s relatively weak system, however, challenge this assumption.137
The Chinese courts are now facilitating the same interests as
nineteenth century American jurists, assisting the government in achieving
national development goals. In order to most efficiently use resources,
particularly land, the CCP is utilizing the Constitutional language that “the
State may, in the public interest, expropriate or requisition private property
of citizens and pay compensation in accordance with the law.”138 China is
allocating public resources to private developers in order to “release
energy”139 previously tied up in stable, secured residential property.140 As of
September 2004, 94,480,000 square meters of property were “idle,” with
134
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residential land accounting for 57,360,000 of that total. 141 The policy
decision to transform these lands from “idle” to “productive” mirrors the
nineteenth century American notion that property held by private developers
was preeminently dynamic, rather than static, “property” being a political
concept that could be morphed to best fit the needs of the country.142
By maintaining control over and responsibility for the commercial
sector, the Chinese government remains ideologically communist.143 Due to
unmanageably rapid growth, however, the State must prioritize economic
expansion at the expense of many citizens displaced by the necessary
development.144 In order to achieve this growth, the CCP has essentially
delegated its regulating powers to the private companies in order to enact a
trickle-down effect, justifying takings for the public good. This policy is
particularly relevant and rhetorically effective in a communist society, where
the entire economy depends on the collective productive forces working for
the collective public good.145 The wealth of a communist country, in other
words, depends on the state both controlling and providing production
venues for the masses. This necessarily renders the term “for public
necessity” ambiguous in a communist society, where wealth for one is in
theory wealth for all.146
Though China’s political climate is notably violent in comparison
with the early American liberal use of eminent domain, 147 the policies
undertaken are not as divergent as initially perceived. China is a country
that is undertaking what is necessary to advance itself to the world stage and
mimicking strategies used by its predecessors, but is uniquely Chinese at its
foundation.148 Nonetheless, American history reveals that absolute property
rights cannot be guaranteed during a transitional economy. 149 Examples
from early American history do not justify China’s current abuses and lack
of legal clarity, but rather add nuance to the criticisms of the CCP’s policies.
While the development strategies succeeded in stimulating the market in the
141
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United States, the Chinese now face the peculiar problem of an increasingly
privatized economy under a communist political regime.150
As the inequities of the market regulation become progressively more
apparent, the common collective and individual private citizens absorb this
predicament as the most vulnerable sector.151 Comparable to the post-New
Deal era in American jurisprudence, there will come a time when this gap
can no longer be ignored and a fair and equitable system must be practically
applied. 152 Given the Chinese population’s dichotomous sentiments of
frustration and sense of entitlement evidenced in the mass protests,
combined with international scrutiny, it appears that time could be drawing
near for China. The solution, however, is not to be found in mimicking
American policies: China’s history and processes should shape a uniquely
Chinese reform.
IV.

CHINA SHOULD REFORM ITS PROCEDURES FOR URBAN DEMOLITION AS
A STEP TOWARD ITS OWN UNIQUE RULE OF LAW

The CCP should renovate its property regime to include more
transparent rights as it advances its socialist rule of law. 153 The Chinese
citizenry’s rights are solidifying but remain largely unenforceable. 154
Consistent with Chinese reluctance to adopt Western models, the CCP
studies other existing governments but insists on remaining ideologically
true to its socialist foundation. Given the intensified scrutiny from both
governments and interests groups abroad, China should take affirmative
steps toward establishing a more equitable system for evictees.
A.

China Has Already Initiated Reforms Consistent with Its Own
Characteristics As It Works Toward Economic and Social Goals

The CCP is not averse to reforming its fledging legal system, but
refuses to depart from its policy of taking a unique Chinese path. The
natural tendency in light of the discussion above is to recommend that the
Chinese government should undergo massive legal reforms that would
include recognition of personal property rights to ownership. It is also easy
to suggest that China should enforce its constitutional amendments as
150
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America started to do once the economy proved itself secure. While these
ideas are optimal, they are unrealistic in light of China’s policy of avoiding
Western political mechanisms. The CCP recently released its first White
Paper on Democracy, stating its national goals to work toward a true
People’s Democracy. 155
In this policy announcement, the CCP
acknowledged it had a long way to go in combining the Marxist theory of
democracy with the reality of China, and was learning from other political
civilizations. 156
China’s socialist political democracy as reiterated
throughout the White Paper, however, should build its democracy based on
its own socialist experience and historical process without copying any other
political model.157
National leaders approve of this approach. An official of the People’s
Supreme Court reflected this approach in an interview, saying that “China
should base itself on its national situation instead of mechanically copying
the experiences gained by [other countries] because China is a socialist
country carrying out the people’s congress system and its state, political, and
judicial systems are essentially different from those of the western
countries.” 158 Even regarding a new draft of property law – something
admittedly alien to modern China – a Chinese legal expert has said:
“[T]he present-day China has no reason to choose [laws from
other nations] as the example for making its own law of
property. The future law of property in China should be able to
fully reflect and meet the trend and generalization of changes in
relations of property in the modernization of man…”159
These Chinese officials and experts represent a fundamental tenet of
China’s current global politics: socialist policies will prevent the wholesale
adoption of capitalist property laws and regulations.
Though the above discussion highlights the CCP’s reluctance to
modify its structural format, a recent revision to the judicial system is
helpful in illuminating the types of reform the Chinese are willing to make.
The Chinese judiciary, appointed by the CCP, has been criticized for lack of
155
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independence, impartiality, and subsequently being prone to corruption. In
response to this censure, the National People’s Congress prompted the
People’s Supreme Court to implement reforms in an effort to create a better
system of adjudication.160
One example of such reforms addresses the Chinese system of
People’s Jurors, a legal mechanism adapted from the U.S.S.R., in place since
the 1950s.161 Initially a response to accusations of corruption and a lack of
independence in their judiciary, the People’s Jurors were citizens appointed
to the bench alongside with the judicial officers.162 The appointees were
largely uneducated, however, and as such the jurors proved to be no more
than the implementation of symbolic figures without any real authority.163
The 2004 reforms to the system of People’s Jurors reveal a basic yet
uniquely Chinese solution to the problem of alleged judicial corruption.164
Now, many of the People’s Jurors are elected by the districts in which they
serve for a term of five years.165 These reforms require citizens to meet
minimal education standards and complete basic legal training before sitting
with the judges.166 They serve on a bench with three official judges upon
request by parties at the initiation of the trial.167 People’s Jurors then have
the same powers as the judges do and can vote alongside them in both
criminal and civil cases.168 Jurors are also called in to hear cases “with
considerable social repercussions,” in a representative capacity for the public,
acting as the equivalent of a magistrate.169 The president of the Supreme
People’s Court said the reform was representative of the fact that “during
such a period [of gaining wealth], the country needs improvement in its
judicial capacity.” The CCP further stipulates that the purpose for adopting
of these measures was to allow transparency in the judiciary and assist in the
guarantee of the citizens’ rights.170
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The process for urban demolition and relocation could benefit from
similar equitable rights, guarantees, transparency and accountability, guided
by Chinese values and political philosophy. Reforming the system of
People’s Jurors represents a willingness on the part of the Chinese to adopt
certain democratic-style innovations, while still maintaining Chinese
characteristics—a value insisted on by the government.171 Though it would
only be a step toward fair compensation, a system like the People’s Jurors
would initiate a more transparent, predictable judicial hearing for evictees.
These renovations would begin to combat the corruption of the urban
redevelopment program. Currently, the board consists of CCP-appointed
administrators who both approve of and collect fees for the original
demolition. As the Regulations stand now, the board that adjudicates is
unfairly biased as the same board that approves of demolition if residents
dispute compensation offered by the developer. If citizen jurors were seated
on the adjudication board, a resident could hope for more adequate monetary
compensation. Though it remains to be seen how much change the People’s
Jurors will effect, a similar system could be implemented at the
administrative level of the eviction hearings in reviewing compensation
amounts to generate more unbiased judgment.
Measures such as these could be taken to further legitimize the
amendments and other facial reforms the Chinese have made. The People’s
Congress expressed its concern for the human rights of its citizens in a white
paper entitled “China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004,” stating, “[t]he
Chinese Government pays special attention to respecting and safeguarding
human rights. It will take effective measures to promote the development of
human rights and to raise the level of human rights and basic freedoms
enjoyed by the Chinese people.” 172 Despite the reluctance shown by the
CCP to rapidly liberalize social controls and implement massive reform in
this area, small steps are being taken. In the socio-political arena, where
massive protests are occurring on a daily basis, it is perhaps time the CCP
acted on its alleged concern for human rights and granted the citizenry a
substantial right, such as just compensation, even if the residents still cannot
challenge an underlying eviction.173 The hope is that, in the end, China will
enforce its version of Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence. In
the meantime, a step toward an equitable system of compensation will help

171
172
173

WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, supra note 158.
CHINA DAILY, supra note 170.
deLisle, supra note 65, at 4.

JUNE 2006

CHINA’S PROPERTY REGIME

621

maintain stability.174 As the Chinese urban population stages protest after
protest, the social strife becomes palpable.175
B.

China Is Ripe for Reform and Should Renovate Its Legal System,
Beginning with the Property Regime

The social turmoil in China resulting from the shortcomings of the
legal system necessitate reform. Much has been written on the inadequacies
of China’s property regime, particularly in light of the recent economic
boom. Given the nature of comparative law, it is difficult not to recommend
installation of political reforms such as separation of powers, creation of an
independent judiciary, and other democratic principles. 176 It is also
presumptuous, however, to assume these mechanisms can be imported to
China’s unique system and be as effective as they have proven to be in other
nations. 177 While it is hopeful for tenants to be able to challenge the
underlying eviction instead of just the compensation amount, and to
recommend that the adjudication board be independent from the department
responsible for the initial approval of demolition plans, these solutions fail to
address the character of Chinese government and its deeper problems.
The unitary party system in China disallows true independence from
any other branch of government, while the top-down process of legislation
ensures provincial and state governments only exercise powers specifically
delegated to them. This system of delegation allows for rampant corruption
in the local governments, however, as the system lacks credible enforcement
mechanisms. 178 There is no separation of powers, either vertically or
horizontally, creating a system of relatively loosely connected centers of
local power, all stemming from the apex of the National People’s Congress,
the central agent of the CCP. 179
In the specific case of forced evictions, the lack of uniformity results
in the various municipalities each creating its own policies within the sphere
of the nationally-issued Regulations.180 The People’s Congress’ Regulations
for Urban House Demolition and Relocation and 2003 Constitutional
Amendments remain too vague for consistent implementation, as evidenced
174
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by the variance of execution from province to province. While many local
governments have taken notable and impressive steps toward a more
equitable system of urban development, others remain convoluted and
oppressive.181 For example, the city of Qingdao passed a circular in April
2005 that requires developers to obtain approval of ninety-five percent of the
affected residents before they proceed with plans. 182 In contrast, Beijing
remains frustratingly opaque and corrupt in its city’s massive remodeling
project.183 Though serving as examples of potential for change, policies that
vary from city to city have little effect on the national front. Genuine
national reforms can only originate from the People’s Congress, where a
uniform policy and procedure for land requisitions and compensation could
be created.
Despite the progress of property regime reform at some municipal
levels, the national government is the only way to disseminate a uniformly
equal policy across China. Corruption within the unitary, one-party CCP
system, however, hinders efforts for achieving such a uniform policy. To
be fair, corruption has been a problem in all transitional governments, but
China has made little progress to address this crippling issue. 184 As
economic development consumes the nation while commercialization and
investment create more wealth to feed the corruption cycle, the CCP has not
revised its hierarchical system to reflect this evolving society. 185 As
economic liberalizations have occurred in the past few decades, the CCP has
seen an upswing in reported corruption, as the incentive to personal revenue
grows in an increasingly profitable economy.186 While reluctant to abandon
its bureaucratic procedures, the CCP is currently taking steps to eradicate the
pervasive corruption within.187 Still insistent on developing its own socialist
market economy within the established unitary political body, the CCP is
taking steps to cleanse the administrative and judicial processes, as
demonstrated by the People’s Jurors.188 The CCP remains the sole organ of
power and dissemination, and it is only from the National People’s Congress
that countrywide change will come.189
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The Chinese People Should Capitalize on International Pressure to
Advance Property Rights Reform

China’s development comes at a time when international standards are
not only emergent, but established, which differs from the fledging
American experience in the nineteenth through early twentieth centuries.
The Chinese government endured and achieved economic development
beyond global expectations within the past twenty years, but that
development has come at a price. 190 While China’s economy is benefiting
from being party to international agreements, a previously isolated China is
now under the critical scrutiny of the international community as a party to
international covenants and a member of the World Bank.191 China’s desire
for legitimacy on the global level necessitates a degree of adherence to
international rules and norms. This entails not only ratifying an international
covenant, but also taking genuine steps to enforce its provisions. This
experience differs in the level of international scrutiny and expectations to
which the United States was not subjected to in the late nineteenth to early
twentieth century.
For example, in 2005 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights held hearings regarding China’s progress in enforcing the
covenant ratified in 2001.192 The Committee, finding a lackluster effort on
the part of the Chinese government, filed numerous complaints and
recommendations, including a special concern about the way in which the
Olympics project was handled. 193 Regarding the forced evictions and
relocations, the Committee asked China to implement “open, effective and
meaningful consultations with affected residents.”194 This is but one way
China’s entry into the international market affects its domestic policy
decisions.
The Olympics are China’s debutante ball, at which the nation intends
to prove its modernization and discard its third-world status once and for
all.195 The CCP is taking the event as seriously as a nation could, while
quietly attempting to quash political dissent within its borders to avoid
190
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controversy and scrutiny.196 China’s worst nightmare is a repeat of the 1968
Mexico City Olympics when thirty student protestors were killed on the eve
of the Games, or perhaps, the 1988 Seoul Olympics where publicly
broadcasted mass protests helped persuade the country to concede
democratic elections to the people.197 Activists claim that a city hosting the
Olympics ought to represent ideals such as human dignity and harmonious
development that are enshrined in the Olympic Charter and Code of Ethics.
These activists are set on ensuring that the values are not only symbolized,
but also realized.198
The torch does not light in Beijing until August 2008, but the anxiety
for has begun. China lost the bid for the 2000 Olympics in large part due to
human rights abuses.199 This coming of age for China unavoidably involves
acknowledgment of international standards, including the right to adequate
housing and freedom from forced eviction.200 The CCP still has time before
the hundreds of thousands of international journalists arrive.
Instigating reforms for clarity and transparency in the urban eviction
procedure might also function to quell surging domestic protests and civil
unrest. Currently, the techniques used by the State to suppress political
activity and protests are failing to stop the massive demonstrations that
plague domestic Chinese society.201 According to one report, the number of
collective acts of protest has risen six-fold in the past decade. 202 The
population’s courage to speak out and protest government abuses comes
from mottos the CCP itself promulgated, such as “The People’s Olympics.”
The jubilation of the celebration in the streets upon winning the 2008 bid
was not staged: the Chinese citizens are truly proud of their country. It is
perhaps this patriotism that inspires protests and hope for change.203 As the
head official of Beijing’s Chaoyang district, Chen Gang puts it, “[t]he
citizens’] political sense is maturing…the Games are changing our
society.” 204 One man forcefully evicted has used his copy of the new
196
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constitution to challenge local authorities, disputing his compensation
amount. He now sits on the sidewalk every day, protesting with a headband
that reads, “[p]rotect the constitution and protect our rights.”205
The government is in a transitional period, one that historically has
shown itself to inherently favor one class over another, catering to the
private developers while fueling the frustration and resentment of the urban
poor.206 This widening gap between the rich and poor is strikingly similar to
the consequence of early American economic development, and especially
out of place in a socialist regime. This friction coupled with the sheer
number of displaced or homeless evictees threatens the social structure the
CCP has strived to create. The residents should be given some development
in the rule of law to renew their dwindling faith in the Party and the nation
of China.
V.

CONCLUSION

Aware of the global attention that the Beijing Olympics would attract,
many countries with an eye on China’s treatment of human rights supported
the bid in hopes that the government would respond by loosening its social
controls.207 Instead of fulfilling these aspirations, the CCP has responded to
evictee protests with incarceration and other methods of suppression,
disregarding petitions and international calls for legal reform while touting
advances toward the rule of law. 208 This inconsistency, given China’s
current position on the world stage, cannot continue unnoticed or
overshadowed by the country’s wealth. The early American experience
lacked this global character, and in this way the Chinese present is unique in
that it is developing at a time where international law is not only established,
but is used as a means to establish international standards.
The stakes are high. Following an era of strong government in early
America, legal reforms and evolutions led to the rights-based framework in
which we now live. The means by which China will arrive at this
conclusion will be necessarily “uniquely Chinese.” 209 Given that the
practice of forced evictions is the source of most protests and social strife,210
it is an ideal place to begin granting stronger rights. By implementing a
205
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system similar to the People’s Jurors in the procedures for urban demolition
and relocation, the CCP could demonstrate to both its citizenry and the
international community that it is maintaining its “Chinese characteristics,”
while taking steps to enact a more transparent, equitable legal system.
Although the interest in development currently overrides individual rights, a
professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology remains optimistic, saying,
“I hope that…more and more people will be able to pay attention to the
Constitution and to safeguard the authority of the Constitution.”211
In writing about the necessity of balancing early American law with
its policies, Justice Holmes looked forward to a time when the desire for a
goal is examined as much as the means used to attain it. Highlighting the
complexity of legal policies in particular contexts, he noted that getting “the
dragon out of his cave…you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what
[his strength is]. But to get him out is only the first step. The next step is
either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.”212 The
time has come for Beijing to make its fledging legal regime a useful animal,
as opposed to a tool to legitimize its interest of economic development.
However similar China’s current situation is to the era in which Holmes
wrote, the creation of a true socialist democracy will be a product of its own.
These expectations will not be achieved easily. At the Oriental Plaza,
an upscale shopping center in Beijing, a homeless man and his father sit
under a bridge holding a sign that says, “Homeless Because of the
Olympics.” 213 Another evicted resident in Beijing complains that “the
Olympics are a good thing for a few people, but not for the majority,”214
reflecting a general malaise spreading throughout the entire country, not just
at the epicenter of the Olympic project. The dichotomy further emphasizes
the international reputation at stake—with the global community watching,
China could either alleviate fears by granting certain limited rights to its
citizens, or could do nothing to its own detriment.
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